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THE IRRATIONALITY OF A RATIONAL BASIS:  
DENYING BENEFITS TO THE CHILDREN OF SAME-SEX COUPLES 
By Sam Castic* 
T hree weeks after Quintin was born to Sherri Kokx and Johanna Bender, he had difficulty breathing.  Alarmed, his parents took him to see his doctor, who,                 
understanding the urgency of the situation, promptly called an 
ambulance.  When the paramedics arrived at the doctor’s   office, 
critical time slipped away as the forms the paramedics had to fill 
out did not recognize that a child could have two parents of the 
same sex.  Critical moments slipped by as the ambulance sat in 
the parking lot as the paramedics refused to accept that Johanna 
and Sherri were both Quintin’s parents.  The doctor’s urgent 
declarations that both women were Quintin’s parents did not 
hasten the paramedics’ actions as the infant Quintin awaited  
essential  medical attention.  The paramedics could not under-
stand that a child could have parents of the same sex. Quintin 
was eventually hospitalized for several days and fortunately sur-
vived, but the episode demonstrated to Sherri and Johanna the 
effect that the lack of legal protection can have on the families of 
same-sex couples and their children.1    
Recent high court decisions in New 
York and Washington have upheld the 
exclusion of same-sex couples from the 
rights and benefits of marriage.  In their 
decisions, each court essentially found 
that marriage statutes were created for 
the benefit of children.  The courts rea-
soned that the state interest in child welfare was furthered by 
restricting the benefits of marriage to opposite-sex couples, irre-
spective of whether the couples had children.  Assuming that the 
benefits and protections provided in marriage statutes serve a 
legitimate state purpose, this article examines the effects that  
exclusionary provisions in those statutes visit directly upon the 
children of same-sex couples. That is, to the extent that  marriage 
rights enable couples to better rear their children, the children of 
same-sex children are disadvantaged.  Accordingly, I argues that 
it is wholly irrational to deny the children of same-sex couples 
the rights and privileges  purportedly created to benefit all chil-
dren. 
In Section I of this article, I address the exclusive nature of 
the rights and benefits extended by marriage.  The section        
examines how marriage statutes operate for the intended  benefit 
of children, and demonstrates how public and private law offer 
no equivalent protection to families headed by same-sex couples.  
Finally, the section will show how the exclusive nature of    mar-
riage disadvantages children being reared by same-sex couples.  
In Section II, I argue that it is irrational to use the sex of a child’s 
parents to determine the rights and privileges that will be ex-
tended to the child.  The section will examine how the exclusion 
of same-sex couples from marriage primarily focuses on the cou-
ples, and how this focus is irrelevant to the actual  fostering of 
child welfare.  The section will examine the recent New York, 
Washington, and New Jersey marriage decisions, and will argue 
that decisions in the former states misapplied the relevant ra-
tional basis tests in reaching their decisions.   
LEGAL RIGHTS AND PROTECTIONS ARE EXTENDED 
ONLY TO SOME COUPLES REARING CHILDREN 
THE RATIONALE FOR MARRIAGE RIGHTS AND PROTECTIONS 
IS TO PROMOTE CHILD DEVELOPMENT 
A key contemporary rationale for governmental extension of 
rights and benefits to couples that marry is that such protections 
promote child welfare.  This is the view that best justifies the 
extension of rights and benefits by the state, as a solely religious 
institution would lack a legitimate state interest for promotion, 
and a purely romantic relationship would logically include  
same-sex couples.  Importantly, proponents of state marriage 
laws embrace this perspective and reject 
describing marriage as the codification 
of a life-long romantic relationship.2 
This child development rationale is 
grounded in the belief that by adding to 
the stability of the family unit, the chil-
dren of married couples are better pro-
vided for, and have increased chances of developmental success. 
Under the rationale, the government extends rights and benefits 
to married couples acting on the   notion that couples are better 
able to rear children than single individuals.  The belief is that 
the presence of two parents is most likely to result in a finan-
cially stable family unit equipped with the resources necessary to 
fulfill the obligations of child rearing.  Rights and benefits pro-
vided with marriage are tailored to support the family unit, corre-
spondingly maximizing child welfare by providing children with 
the best family and household in which to be reared. The rights 
and benefits created in  marriage laws can thus be seen as a set of 
inducements for couples with children to marry and stay to-
gether, which arguably ensures the optimal circumstances for the 
child’s development.3       
In addition to benefiting from an intuitively logical appeal, 
the two-parent model finds support in social science.  Social  
science data are uniformly in agreement that family structure 
affects child development and that the rights conditioned upon 
marital status help to benefit children.4 Both proponents and   
opponents of extending the rights of marriage recognize that the 
status of marriage  benefits the children that the couple rears.  
However, there is no consensus on the degree to which it is the 
status of marriage as opposed to the presence of two parents that 
The paramedics could not    
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contributes to a child’s development.5  Maggie Gallagher’s sur-
vey of the social science data helpfully groups the benefits mari-
tal family structure offers to children into six categories: psycho-
logical adjustment, physical health and  longevity, crime and 
delinquency, child abuse, education and socioeconomic attain-
ment, and family formation.6  According to Gallagher, studies 
show that the psychological well-being of children reared by 
married parents is stronger, that divorce disrupts children’s men-
tal development, and that youth suicide is correlated to divorce 
and being reared by single parents.7  As to physical health and 
longevity, infant mortality rates are sig-
nificantly higher when the mother is 
unmarried, health  problems increase for 
children reared by single parents, and 
the child’s life expectancy is reduced by 
divorce.8  With respect to crime and 
delinquency, boys reared by divorced or 
single parents are significantly more 
likely to become delinquent or engage in criminal behavior.  
Teens in single  parent households are generally more attached 
to their peer groups and subsequently are more inclined to be 
delinquent.9  Child abuse is more prevalent in households with 
single mothers, and the   presence of a mother’s boyfriend or a 
stepfather increases the likelihood that a child will be abused.10  
Children in divorced or  unmarried households do not perform as 
well in school, are more likely to be held back, and are less 
likely to go to college.11  Subsequent family formation by chil-
dren reared by a divorced or unmarried parent are more likely to 
be characterized by divorce and unwanted pregnancy.12  
 Gallagher’s survey of the data was employed to demonstrate 
that family structure is important to child development, and that 
extending the state rights and benefits of marriage to opposite-
sex couples is the best way of promoting the  formation and  
continuation of a family structure conducive to optimal child 
development.13 As Gallagher admits though, there is no social 
science consensus about the extent to which the data show that 
households with married parents are better settings for rearing 
children than are those with unmarried parents.14  While there is 
much consensus among social scientists that having two parents 
is generally better than having one, the consensus about the   
advantage that married parents offer seems to be limited to the 
benefits of the legal and social rights extended in marriage, and 
not the fact of having opposite-sex parents.15    
EXISTING LAW DOES NOT UNIFORMLY EXTEND                
RIGHTS AND PROTECTIONS TO SAME-SEX                                  
COUPLES REARING CHILDREN 
The government extends a wide array of legal rights and 
privileges to married couples  rearing children.  The rights and 
privileges given at the federal, state, and local levels benefit both 
the couple and the children they rear. These rights and privileges 
are extended regardless of whether the child is biologically    
related to either spouse.  The same rights and privileges are   
extended whether the child was naturally conceived or whether 
their life began with the assistance of artificial reproductive 
methods.  Thus, the goal is the fostering of a family unit        
irrespective of biology.   
Both federal and state governments guarantee rights that 
directly and indirectly benefit the children of opposite-sex     
married couples.  At the federal level, over 1,000 benefits, rights, 
and privileges are available to married couples.16  At the state 
level, the rights can be categorized into those that protect the 
spousal relationship, enforce spouses’ obligations to one another, 
treat spouses as a single financial unit, and extend protections to 
the children of married couples.17  These 
rights are meant both to bind the couple 
together and to benefit the children they 
rear, and as marital rights, they are un-
available to the children of unmarried 
couples. Lewis A. Silverman enumer-
ates the benefits extended legally and 
socially to married couples and their 
children, organizing them into the following categories: govern-
ment benefits, tax benefits, immigration privileges, employer 
benefits, and other benefits.18 While a complete examination of 
these benefits is beyond the scope of this article, a brief summary 
reveals the extent and importance of the rights of marriage to 
couples rearing children.     
Tax benefits are extended to families at the federal and state 
levels.  The right to file federal taxes jointly often results in 
lower marginal tax rates for a married couple in addition to 
lower overall tax liability.19  Married couples are not taxed on 
benefits, such as health care, that are extended by their spouse’s   
employer, though any comparable benefits extended to          
employees in same-sex unions are.20  With regard to tax on a 
decedent’s estate, partners in a same-sex union do not qualify for 
the deduction extended to surviving spouses, which “in turn 
takes away financial resources the surviving parent would be 
able to spend on their child.”21  
Immigration law also affords special status to married     
couples, permitting the couple to reside permanently in the   
country as long as spouse is a United States citizen. This      
privilege is not extended to parties to a same-sex union, which 
may result in the separation of a family unit when both parents 
are not United States citizens.  Importantly, children have no   
independent status or means to preserve their family unit, which 
can lead to the child’s being separated from one of the legal      
...studies show that the                   
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parents is stronger... 
...the advantage that married parents        
offer seems to be limited to the benefits of 
the legal and social rights extended in        
marriage, and not the fact of having        
opposite-sex parents. 
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parents who is not permitted to enter or remain in the country.22 
Employer benefits are another realm in which the lack of 
recognition of the same-sex union disadvantages the children of 
same-sex couples.  Employer-provided surviving family benefits 
are not generally extended to a surviving party of a same-sex 
relationship or any non-
biological child that the couple 
reared.23  The practice of exclu-
sion is found both in federal and 
state   employment.24 Employer-
provided health care commonly      
extended to spouses and chil-
dren of the employee is not re-
quired to be given to the non-biological child of, or partner to, a 
same-sex  union.  Employer grants of leave to care for one’s 
family member do not have to cover time away from work to 
care for a non-biological child or a same-sex partner.25  In addi-
tion, there are no national non-discrimination laws in employ-
ment, housing, or public accommodations that protect people in 
same-sex relationships from discrimination on the basis of the 
sexual orientation or gender identity which   characterizes their 
family. Parties to such  relationships who serve in the military 
cannot cover their partner or non-biological child with cost of 
living allowances or death benefits should they die.26 The exam-
ples above show some of the ways in which employer benefits 
that are not extended on an equal basis to same and opposite-sex   
couples, thus resulting in less protection for children in families 
with same-sex unions.  In the absence of state and federal law 
mandating the contrary, the list could be broadened to include 
any employee benefit that adds to the  security of their family.  
The final category of rights and benefits from which same-
sex couples are excluded are tangible and intangible privileges.  
Not being recognized as a family under the law, a same-sex   
couple that decides to dissolve its relationship faces custody, 
visitation, and child support questions that are clearly answered 
for married couples.  Custody and visitation are not guaranteed, 
even for a well-qualified parent, if she or he is not the biological 
parent.  By not recognizing the relationship as a marriage, the 
law poses greater challenges for courts that seek to impose child 
support obligations on the parent who does not retain custody, 
especially if she or he is a non-biological parent. Non-
recognition also poses problems for families if one of the parties 
to a same-sex union dies wrongfully, for the surviving adult, and 
child if not biological, will not have standing to bring a wrongful 
death action.27 Intangible benefits include   permitting the family 
to be recognized as a family unit within the cultural               
understanding of a family, which conceivably helps to reduce the 
stigma that has historically burdened the children of unmarried 
parents.28  
The rights and privileges that are extended in marriage are 
only extended to couples that are legally married, a status that is 
reserved for a socially-sanctioned sexual union.29 Most of the 
rights emphasize the couple’s mutual obligations to each other 
and operate to bring social and legal recognition to the couple 
and children as a family unit.  In delineating which family units 
are recognized under the law, married heterosexual unions are 
the model, and non-marital arrangements, including families 
headed by same-sex couples, are deliberately excluded from   
recognition. Opposite-sex couples are the only relationship    
uniformly entitled to the status 
of marriage  under the law, and 
consequently, are the only rela-
tionship entitled to the rights and 
privileges extended in mar-
riage.30 Though marriage is gen-
erally understood to be a sexual 
union, the opposite-sex marital        
relationship is entitled to privacy, and the sexual nature of the 
couple is free from inquiry from the government.31  Laws against 
consanguinity and polygamy implicitly recognize marriage as a 
sexual union, and restricting marriage to a sexual union model 
largely forecloses non-traditional or caretaking models of family 
from being legally recognized.32       
Supporters of the current delineation of legal recognition 
and exclusion among relationships claim that there are inherent 
differences in the nature of marital and non-marital relationships, 
and that the former is generally a stronger relationship than the 
latter.33 Some claim that marriage may also be viewed as a    
social good in and of itself, a perspective used to justify          
opposition to extending quasi-legal statuses to cohabitating    
couples who do not marry.34 Obviously, opposite-sex couples are 
free to partake in the legal benefits and obligations of marriage 
by choosing to get married, a choice that can be freely made    
irrespective of the circumstances of their relationship. In spite of 
the availability of marriage for opposite-sex couples, some state 
courts have permitted equitable theories and private contracts to 
approximate some of the obligations between unmarried  parties 
to a relationship, but the number of such states is small.35       
Recognition of equitable theories and private contracts generally 
involve only obligations between the parties and not specific 
rights from the state to benefit their children.36  Within             
non-marital cohabitating relationships with children, biological 
parents may have rights under the law with respect to their     
biological child, but the law’s  recognition of such rights is by 
virtue of their biological tie to the child rather than the couple’s 
continued relationship. For cohabitating people with non-
biological children, most states permit second-parent adoptions, 
but fewer states permit same-sex couples to secure their family 
through the process.37  
Same-sex couples are prohibited from marrying in every 
state except for Massachusetts. Massachusetts only permits    
marriage where one of the parties is a resident of  Massachusetts, 
Custody and visitation are not guaranteed, 
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or he is not the  biological parent. 
Same-sex couples are prohibited           
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or where the couple resides in a state without a well-founded 
public policy opposed to same-sex marriage.38  Accordingly, few 
of the nation’s same-sex couples are able to marry in             
Massachusetts.  If a couple does marry in Massachusetts, or any 
other jurisdiction where same-sex  marriage becomes legal, the 
Defense of Marriage Act permits states and jurisdictions to    
refuse to recognize same-sex marriages or unions, and for federal 
purposes, same-sex unions are never legally recognized         
regardless of where they were preformed.39  As a result of the 
Defense of Marriage Act and the lack of state laws sanctioning 
same-sex unions, the rights and privileges of marriage are     
effectively denied to same-sex couples and their children 
throughout most of the country. 
Some states grant a range of the rights of marriage to same-
sex couples who enter into domestic partnerships or civil unions.  
Vermont, Connecticut, New Jersey, and, beginning in 2008, New 
Hampshire, offer civil unions that extend nearly all of the state 
recognized rights and benefits of marriage to same-sex couples.40  
California, Hawaii, Maine, Washing-
ton, the District of             Columbia, 
and, beginning in 2008, Oregon, 
permit domestic partnerships for 
same-sex couples, and extend differ-
ing numbers of the rights and bene-
fits of marriage to same-sex cou-
ples.41 Ultimately, civil unions and 
domestic partnerships lack interstate recognition pursuant to the 
Defense of Marriage Act,42 and their effectiveness in offering the 
same degree of protection to family units headed by same-sex 
couples as state and federally recognized marriages are clearly 
inferior.43 
 A child born to or adopted by a married couple is gener-
ally presumed to be the child of the couple, and both parties to 
the couple are legally presumed to be the parents of the child.44  
When both parties to a couple have parental rights with respect 
to their child, then they are considered to have a legal              
relationship with the child.  As same-sex couples cannot marry, 
they have no legal presumption supporting their parental rights 
and can only obtain such status if they reside in a jurisdiction 
where joint or second-parent adoption proceedings are  available 
to same-sex couples.  Joint adoption by the couple, or second-
parent adoption by the partner without parental rights are means 
of assuring that parties to a same-sex couple both have their   
parental rights preserved.45  Joint or second-parent adoption by a 
same-sex couple has been judicially permitted in many            
jurisdictions when it comports with the best interests of the child; 
however, it is not uniformly available.46  Parental status involves 
a number of legal rights and responsibilities, and benefits the 
child by bringing security to the parent-child relationship.47  The 
security of the parent-child relationship often becomes critical if 
the same-sex partner separates; in the absence of parental status, 
a same-sex partner who has jointly reared a child can see their 
relationship with the child eliminated without any legal          
recourse.48  Even where parental status is available to preserve 
the parent-child relationship, it cannot confer the legal benefits 
of marriage that are designed to benefit the child of the couple.49  
Subsequently, the ability of a same-sex couple to obtain parental 
rights with respect to a child does not eliminate the disadvantage 
faced by the child. 
 
PRIVATE LAW IS NOT AN EQUIVALENT MEANS FOR SAME-
SEX COUPLES TO SECURE RIGHTS 
Some of the legal rights and benefits that opposite-sex     
couples enjoy can be secured for same-sex couples through    
private contract.  The private right to contract is, however, not an 
equivalent substitute for positive legal rights, such as marital and 
parental rights, which offer clear legal protection to families.  
Private contract can only address the obligations between the     
parties to the contract, and it has no authority to bind non-parties, 
such as the government. Accordingly, rights of inheritance, 
power of attorney, and medical decision-making authority, 
which pertain solely to the rights between the parties, can be 
granted through private contract.  
However, rights such as tax-filing 
status and liability, parental custody, 
health care coverage, or standing for 
wrongful death claims cannot be 
extended through private contract 
between the parties to a same-sex 
relationship.  Without the benefit of 
legal status, families headed by same-sex couples cannot obtain 
the positive rights that extend automatically with marriage.  
Where a couple does seek to secure rights through  contract, 
they will typically have no expertise in the legal requirements to 
do effectively and often need to hire an attorney. The time and 
expense of hiring an attorney is considerable for many couples,50 
and it almost certainly means that many same-sex couples do not 
avail themselves to the protections of private law.  Even where 
couples believe that they have taken the precautions necessary to 
protect their family unit, their efforts can be challenged by         
disapproving relatives in ways that marriages cannot.51               
Unfortunately, such challenges often come at times of family 
emergency or death, when the family is most likely to need the 
protections, and when the lack of legal recognition for the family 
is most devastating.52 
SAME-SEX COUPLES ARE REARING, AND WILL CONTINUE  
TO REAR, CHILDREN 
Irrespective of the merits of same-sex couples rearing     
children, same-sex couples are rearing children, and have been 
for years.  The 2000 Census reported that there were more than 
160,000 families with children headed by same-sex couples in 
the United States.53  This is a conservative figure, given the 
likely of underreporting of same-sex couples in the Census.54  
Underreporting aside, the figure is almost certainly higher  today 
as the estimated number of same-sex headed households has 
increased, and a significant portion of gay and lesbian   people 
already are biological or adoptive parents.55  Moreover, nearly 
half of all gay or lesbian people desire to have children.56  In 
Without the benefit of legal status,         
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spite of the lack of legal recognition for their families, it is 
unlikely that there will be any decrease in the  number of same-
sex couples rearing children. 
While state law can, and often does, disadvantage same-sex 
couples that seek to become parents, once a child is a legal or 
biological child of one of the parents, the couple can generally 
rear the child as long as the legal parent is present.57  A ban on a 
legal parent’s cohabitating with someone of the same sex, and 
choosing to jointly assume parental roles, would likely violate 
the  federal Constitution as parenting is likened to a fundamental 
right.58  Though the Supreme Court’s constitutional protection of 
the parent-child relationship deals largely with biological         
relationships, its rationale is applicable to all parent-child rela-
tionships once established, regardless of whether or not they are 
biological.59  Accordingly, the state would need a compelling 
interest to disrupt the parent-child relationship, which they 
would not be likely to demonstrate.  In 
spite of historical efforts preventing gay 
or lesbian parents from gaining or     
retaining custody of their child, courts 
are increasingly finding sexual orienta-
tion not to be determinative or even rele-
vant to the determination of a child’s 
best interests.60  As same-sex couples continue to rear children, 
and as the parent-child relationship is constitutionally protected, 
the families they comprise exist without the rights and benefits 
of marriage. 
IT IS IRRATIONAL TO USE PARENTAL STATUS TO        
DETERMINE THE LEGAL RIGHTS FROM WHICH          
CHILDREN BENEFIT  
 The preceding sections of this article have demonstrated the 
ways in which the law extends legal rights and benefits to      
families headed by opposite-sex couples that choose to get     
married.  The sections have also explored the ways in which 
similarly situated families headed by same-sex couples are 
largely excluded from the statutory schemes, as well as why  
private law offers no equivalent substitute for the comprehensive 
statutory scheme.  As the exclusion of same-sex couples from 
marriage directly impacts the children they rear, the rationality of 
the system merits a closer evaluation to determine whether the 
rights purportedly created for the benefit of children are so      
tailored. 
 
THE JUSTIFICATION FOR EXCLUSION FOCUSES ON THE 
STATUS OF THE COUPLES REARING THE CHILDREN 
The justification for denying the families headed by same-
sex couples the protections offered to families headed by       
opposite-sex couples focuses on the nature of the relationship of 
the couple heading the family, overlooking the needs of the    
children they rear.61 Both proponents and opponents of          
extending rights to families headed by same-sex couples adhere 
to the focus on the couple, thus reinforcing the issue as being one 
of what is owed to the couple and not of what best serves the 
children reared by the couple. 
The proponents of extending rights and protections to same-
sex couples often frame the issue as one of  discrimination, 
which ultimately focuses on the couple.  Specifically, the denial 
of recognition is viewed in terms of discrimination against the 
same-sex couple, the parties to the same-sex couple, and homo-
sexual people in general, as evidenced by recent court decisions 
and public argument offered by proponents.62  To the extent that 
the plight of the children of same-sex couples is addressed, it is 
done as a secondary matter.  The framing of the issue as one of          
discrimination tends to overlook the effects on the children63 and 
reinforces the tactics of the opponents of recognizing same-sex 
families. 
Opponents of granting rights to families headed by same-sex 
couples can be motivated by a number of 
different reasons.    Often rooted in the be-
lief that sexual orientation is a choice, they 
may seek to deny legal   incentives that 
promote people acting on homosexual de-
sires, to codify  homophobic sentiments 
into law, or to protect child development by 
preventing children from being reared by same-sex couples.64  
All of the aforementioned motivations directly reject the         
framing of the denial of rights to same-sex couples as             
discriminatory, but nevertheless focus on the nature of the               
relationship of the same-sex couple.65 
Most major psychological and medical organizations   reject 
the notion that sexual orientation is mutable,66 and advocates of 
equal rights for gay and lesbian people vigorously oppose the 
notion.  Nonetheless, the lack of definitive scientific proof that 
sexual orientation is caused exclusively by biological or genetic 
factors keeps this debate alive.67  The support for the mutability 
perspective still holds influence for more than those dedicated to 
the cause of opposing recognition of rights for same-sex couples. 
For example, in the recent marriage decision by the Washington 
State Supreme Court, the plurality noted that there was not a 
sufficient showing to conclude that homosexuality is immutable, 
and that the “question is being researched and debated across the 
country.”68 Those who believe that sexual orientation is a choice 
may not want to permit children to be reared in families headed 
by same-sex couples, primarily out of concern with the influence 
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that the parents’ homosexuality will have on the  children.69 
Opposition to rights for gays and lesbians can also be 
grounded in a policy theory of non-promotion. Professor       
William Eskridge refers to such an approach as the “no promo 
homo” approach to legislating.70  Related to the idea that homo-
sexuality is a choice, opponents of granting rights to same-sex 
couples’ families claim that their reasons are rooted in a desire 
not to promote behavior that they view as undesirable.  If the 
rights granted to couples are meant as incentives for the couples 
to stay together and rear their children, proponents of the “no 
promo homo” theory would argue that the same incentives 
should not be used to promote  
homosexuality.  Advocates of the 
“no promo homo” theory would 
not frame the matter as one of   
discrimination, but rather, would 
view it as a matter of not extending 
“special rights” or refusing to    
create incentives for behavior with 
which they disagree. 
Some who oppose recognizing 
families headed by same-sex     
couples express concern with the best interest of the children that 
same-sex couples rear and claim that  inherent  differences be-
tween same and opposite-sex relationships lead to the latter be-
ing the ideal setting in which to rear children.71  George A. Re-
kers has argued that children fare less well when reared by same-
sex couples because such relationships are less stable,  social 
stigma of homosexuality negatively affects them, and they do  
not  have  proper  male  and  female  role  models.72  Maggie 
Gallagher and Joshua K. Baker take a different approach, restat-
ing the social science consensus surrounding the benefit offered 
to children of married couples and claiming that most all of the 
social science conclusions supporting the fitness of same-sex 
parents are  premised on studies which have methodological er-
rors, or which do not provide direct evidence that married same-
sex couples would be as competent as married opposite-sex cou-
ples at  rearing children.73  The reasoning continues that since 
there is not sufficient evidence that same-sex couples would per-
form as well in marriage, same-sex couples should continue to be 
denied marriage rights.74 
At first glance, these reasons for opposing rights for families 
headed by same-sex couples appear to legitimately consider the 
interests of the children without letting the status of the couple 
rearing the children unduly bias its judgment.  Unfortunately, a 
deeper examination shows that the perspective is cut from the 
same cloth.75  Such positions interpret social science data in a 
way contrary to the mainstream scientific and professional     
consensus in order to draw the conclusion that children will     
suffer if reared by a same-sex couple.76 George Rekers’         
argument is typical of this perspective.  Rekers’ assertion that 
same-sex couples are less stable than opposite-sex couples is 
premised on comparing couples that don’t have the right to 
marry with legally married opposite-sex couples, a setup which 
predetermines the result.77   While Rekers’ second assertion that 
children of same-sex couples may be prone to teasing on account 
of their parents’ relationship, social science data does not support 
finding any worse psychological consequences.78  Rekers’ third 
assertion is essentially what Maggie Gallagher’s work is          
concerned with – the belief that children need mothers and     
fathers.  This too is unsupported in the social science findings as 
it depends on a conflation of the well supported belief that two 
married parents matter, with the unfounded notion that were 
same-sex couples able to marry, they would be less competent 
than opposite-sex  couples at rearing children.79  In the end,    
social science offers strong sup-
port for the belief that having 
married parents benefits child 
development, and a notably               
uncontradicted, yet not long-
studied degree of support for the 
belief that same-sex couples are 
as good as opposite-sex couples 
at rearing children. Nonetheless, 
so long as same-sex couples    
parent, the proper question 
should focus not on whether the couples are as competent as  
opposite-sex couples, but whether continued denial of legal rec-
ognition of the family serves the child’s best interests. 
THE NATURE OF THE COUPLE REARING THE CHILDREN IS  
IRRELEVANT TO RATIONALITY 
One of the key contemporary justifications for marital laws 
is that marriage directly and indirectly benefits the children 
reared by the couple.  That the children of same-sex couples are 
excluded from these benefits makes it unquestionable that the 
marriage statutes are underinclusive, and that opposite-sex cou-
ples that are unable or unwilling to have children are able to 
marry makes the statutes overinclusive.  This underinclusivity 
and overinclusivity casts serious doubt on whether child welfare 
is the real legislative purpose of marriage laws, or merely a    
contemporary justification for maintaining an exclusive set of 
statutory benefits for opposite-sex couples.  If the goal were truly 
child welfare, the most direct way of accomplishing the goal 
would be permitting all couples that have children to marry.  
Such a policy would be easy to administer, and would            
acknowledge that all children are equally entitled to the rights 
and benefits purportedly created for child welfare.               
Unfortunately, such policy changes have not been forthcoming, 
and the reality is that there is a large class of children that are not 
able to have their development assisted by rights purportedly 
created for their benefit.  More than the promotion of child     
welfare, which necessarily would involve promoting the welfare 
of the children of same-sex couples, an overriding interest in 
preserving the exclusively opposite-sex nature of marriage is 
embedded in our laws. 
In failing to fully promote child welfare for all children, the 
law distinguishes between the children that will and will not 
...so long as same-sex couples parent, the 
proper question should focus not on          
whether the couples are as competent as           
opposite-sex couples, but whether             
continued denial of legal recognition of           
the family serves the child’s best interests. 
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benefit from the rights and privileges it    creates on the basis of 
the child’s parents.  In doing so, it visits a punishment on the      
children of same-sex couples by denying them the full scope of 
opportunity offered to the children of opposite-sex couples.  
Though irrelevant to the stated goal of child development, the 
classification rests on the sexual orientation of the child’s      
parents, and discriminates against them for something that they 
have no control over. 
The Supreme Court’s treatment of illegitimacy offers an 
instructive parallel to the broader question of whether it is just to 
punish a child for the status or actions of their parents.  The 
Court has recognized that the Constitution’s Equal Protection 
and Due Process Clauses are a barrier to statutes created to deter 
actions or behavior among adults while placing a significant part 
of the burden on children who bear no responsibility for the 
adults’ actions or behavior.  In Weber v. Aetna Casualty & 
Surety Co., the Court struck down a ban on compensation       
recovery rights for unacknowledged illegitimate children.80  The 
majority reasoned that “imposing disabilities on the illegitimate 
child is contrary to the basic concept of our system that legal 
burdens should bear some relationship to individual               
responsibility or wrongdoing.”81 Noting that laws dissuading 
non-marital sex were common, the Court concluded that 
“penalizing the illegitimate child is an ineffectual – as well as an 
unjust – way of deterring the parent.”82 The development of the 
jurisprudence following Weber has found that classifications 
based on legitimacy are to be subjected to heightened scrutiny, 
and the Court has maintained the 
view that it is unjust to penalize 
children in order to deter the be-
havior of their parents.83 
As with statutes that punished 
children for being born to and 
reared by families that did not 
benefit from socially constructed 
norms of legitimacy, statutes        
denying children of same-sex     
couples the benefits of legal rights created to  promote child   
welfare similarly disadvantage children for the conduct of their 
parents.  The disadvantages created through the denial are 
equally unjust   because the children burdened possess no choice 
in the structure of the family that rears them.  However, as long 
as the debate over extending rights to families headed by same-
sex couples focuses on the couples, and not on the children they 
rear, this injustice will continue, and children will endure the                  
consequences.  Lewis A. Silverman argues that the focus on the 
adult relationship, and not on the independent claim that the   
children have to these rights, distorts the analysis that should be 
undertaken when considering whether families with children 
should be protected by the full scope of the law.84  By positing 
children as people protected by the Constitution and viewing 
their right to benefits as deriving from their dependent status, 
Silverman reasons that many of the arguments against            
recognizing families with same-sex parents are eliminated.85 The 
fact that courts are finding marriage rights to have been created 
for the benefit of children provides even more powerful support 
for viewing the question of extending such rights from the      
perspective of the child. By not focusing on the needs of the  
children and the ways in which the lack of rights and  protections 
for the family affects the children, children are being dis-
advantaged and will continue to be so long as they are denied the 
child welfare benefits for which marriage  statutes were            
purportedly created. 86 
EXISTING LAW IS THOUGHT TO BE RATIONAL THROUGH A MIS-
APPLICATION OF RATIONAL BASIS SCRUTINY 
The denial of the rights and benefits of marriage to the     
children of same-sex couples has been upheld as rational in two 
recent decisions of state high courts, and it has been found to be 
irrational in one.  Though the decisions suffer from a misguided 
framing by focusing less on the logic of denying rights and    
responsibilities to families rearing children, and more on the 
claim same-sex couples have to the rights and responsibilities of 
marriage, the courts upholding rationality consistently found the 
legitimate state interest in marriage to be about having and     
rearing children.  With children as the legislative purpose of 
marriage law, courts find a classification based on the couple 
rearing the children to be rational only by ignoring the actual 
presence and needs of the children  intentionally excluded by the 
classification drawn. Recent high court decisions in  Washington 
and New York  embody this emerging trend, as both courts, after 
employing variations of the tradi-
tional equal protection analysis, 
found that it is rational for states to 
extend benefits to families headed 
by opposite-sex couples while ex-
cluding families headed by same-
sex couples. By contrast, the New 
Jersey Supreme Court found that it 
is irrational to exclude families 
headed by opposite-sex couples 
from the rights and benefits of marriage. The New Jersey       
decision demonstrates the central flaw of the Washington and 
New York applications of rational basis scrutiny; by failing to       
examine the rationality of how the classification, which focuses 
on the    parents, furthers the state’s interest in children, the New 
York and Washington courts did not meaningfully apply rational 
basis analysis. 
In Hernandez v. Robles, the New York Court of Appeals 
held that the exclusion of same-sex couples from the state     
marriage laws was constitutional under both the New York       
Constitution and the Constitution of the United States.87  The 
court found that neither state nor federal Due Process or Equal 
Protection clauses were violated by the exclusion of same-sex 
couples, as there was a legitimate state interest in promoting 
child welfare,88 and there were at least two rational bases upon 
which the legislature could limit marriage to opposite sex      
couples in order to protect child welfare: promoting familial     
Though irrelevant to the stated goal         
of child development, the classification 
rests on the sexual orientation of the 
child’s parents, and discriminates             
against them for something that                    
they have no control over. 
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stability and ensuring children are reared by a mother and       
father.89  The court noted that both bases were derived from the 
“undisputed assumption that marriage is important to the welfare 
of children.”90 
The court reasoned that extending marriage to opposite-sex 
couples could rationally promote familial stability if the         
legislature believed that heterosexual couples, whose sexual  
union may result in unexpected child birth, require more        
incentives than same-sex couples to stay together and rear the 
children they bring into the world.91  Though admitting that 
same-sex couples often have children, the court reasoned that the 
planned nature of having children in same-sex relationships 
could inform the legislature’s belief that opposite-sex couples 
need the inducements provided by marriage more than same-sex         
couples.92  This rational basis thus implicitly recognizes some 
objective societal   benefit in having couples that reproduce enter 
into a marriage.  If this basis is unique from the goal of having a 
mother and father rear a child, which is the second rational  basis 
identified by the court, the societal good must be a recognition 
that two parents are better able to rear a child than one parent, 
and that the state is justified in creating incentives for parents to 
stay together. 
Additionally, the court found that it would have been       
rational for the legislature to believe that it is optimal for        
children to be reared by a mother and father, a notion which if 
unsupported by social science, could still be supported by “the 
common-sense premise that children will do best with a mother 
and father in the home.”93 The court essentially said that        
majoritarian societal preferences, as manifested in culture and 
tradition, are sufficient to merit the state effort at promoting 
child welfare by extending safeguards and legal protections to 
opposite-sex couples rearing children while denying the same 
protections to children reared by same-sex couples.  Based on 
the assumption that opposite-sex couples provide a better       
upbringing to children, the court concluded that the legislature is 
rational “to offer a special inducement, the legal recognition of 
marriage, to encourage the formation of opposite-sex  house-
holds.”94 
In Hernandez, Chief Judge Kaye challenged the majority’s 
application of rational basis review.  Kaye noted that equal      
protection’s “rational-basis review requires both the existence of 
a legitimate interest and that the classification rationally advance 
that interest.” 95  To this end, the proper  framing of the question 
was “whether there exists a rational basis for excluding same-sex 
couples from marriage, and, in fact, whether the State’s interests 
in recognizing or supporting opposite-sex marriages are         
rationally furthered by the exclusion.”96  Kaye found that while 
child welfare was potentially promoted through the inducement 
of marriage for couples that have children, none of the state’s 
interests were furthered by excluding same-sex couples from 
marriage.97 
The first rational basis pertains to promoting familial         
stability for couples that procreate.  As discussed previously, to 
the extent that child welfare is the goal, this amounts to little 
more than a state interest in promoting marriage for couples that 
have children, which is rooted in the belief that two parents are 
better equipped to rear a child than one parent. What the         
majority opinion overlooks is that the children of same-sex     
couples also benefit from having two parents,98 and thus are 
equally included in any state interest that aims to promote      
children having two legal parents.  Having two parents rearing a 
child, in general, increases the ability to provide for the child’s 
financial, emotional, and developmental needs.  This common 
sense belief is supported by the social science data on the issue, 
and is a key justification for why most all of the major           
professional organizations concerned with child development 
and welfare support extending comparable rights and benefits to 
families headed by same-sex couple that rear children.99 
 The second rational basis found in Hernandez for advancing 
the state interest in child welfare was the interest in having a 
mother and father to rear the child.  The court found this rational 
basis to be rooted in intuition and common sense.  Like the first 
rational basis, the second justification is irrational to the extent 
that child welfare is the ultimate goal.  Indeed in contradiction to 
the data accumulated thus far which find no adverse               
consequences for children reared in families headed by same-sex 
couples,100 the courts find it rational to allow tradition and          
societal preference to trump the needs of the children being 
reared by same-sex couples.  As same-sex couples already are 
rearing children, and will continue to do so, all the while being 
denied rights and protections for their families, the question is no 
longer one of whether such children ought to have an upbringing 
in accord with majoritarian notions of the ideal; rather, the        
question is whether such majoritarian ideals are a rational            
justification for punishing the children of same-sex couples by 
denying them rights and benefits aimed at ensuring child       
welfare. The answer with respect to the same-sex headed      
families that have formed is clearly no, unless we are to believe 
that the inducement lures homosexual people into opposite-sex     
marriages for the purposes of reproducing — hardly a healthy or 
stable relationship to rear children in.  Since the inducement does 
not operate with respect to homosexual people, and since       
children are being reared in homes headed by same-sex couples, 
the classification cannot be seen to further the state’s interest, but 
rather, can only be seen as a classification drawn to disadvantage 
homosexuals and families headed by same-sex couples.101 
In Andersen v. King County, the Washington State Supreme 
Court held that the state’s Defense of Marriage Act (“DOMA”), 
which was passed to deny the ability of same-sex couples to 
marry, was constitutional under the Washington State            
Constitution.102  Applying a form of equal protection analysis,103 
the court essentially found procreation, familial stability, and 
traditional nuclear families to be the three legitimate state        
interests promoted by the DOMA.104 The court reasoned that 
encouraging procreation was a legitimate governmental interest, 
and that couples that marry may be more likely to procreate.105  
The limitation of marriage to opposite-sex couples is related to 
that interest because “no other relationship has the potential to 
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create, without third party involvement, a child biologically    
related to both parents.”106  Relatedly, the court found that it was 
rational to believe that encouraging marriage for couples that can 
naturally procreate would be preferable to having children reared 
by unmarried parents, an interest which conceivably seeks to 
protect the best interests of children.107  The court also found that 
it was a legitimate state interest to promote having children 
reared in a home headed by their opposite-sex parents,108  to the 
extent that the legislature believed that children thrive in house-
holds composed of a father, mother, and their biological         
children.109  Thus, the court believed that the legislature was  
rational to conclude that child welfare was fostered by the      
encouragement of rearing children in traditional nuclear families, 
and that the exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage      
furthered that interest. 
In Andersen, Justice Fairhurst’s dissent challenged the    
plurality’s application of the rational basis inquiry, noting that 
under Washington law, the “requirement that a classification 
have a rational basis dictates that the issue in [the] case be 
framed as whether the exclusion of same-sex couples from civil 
marriage is rationally related to a legitimate [state]  interest.”110  
As the state’s DOMA was the only statute being challenged, the 
dissent argued that the focus on the rationality of extending 
rights and benefits to opposite-sex couples was immaterial to the 
inquiry, for “DOMA in no way affects the right of opposite-sex 
couples to marry – the only intent and effect of DOMA was to 
explicitly deny same-sex couples the right to marry.”111 
Applying the dissent’s equal protection standard to the first 
state interest, that of promoting procreation, the exclusion of 
same-sex couples from marriage would have to be deemed to be 
rationally related to the interest.  On this relationship the dissent 
noted that “there is no logical way that denying the right to marry 
to same-sex couples will encourage heterosexual couples to   
procreate with greater frequency.”112  Similarly, there seems to 
be no logical way of concluding that denying the right to marry 
to same-sex couples would discourage heterosexual couples 
from procreating.  Indeed, it is difficult to see how the ability of 
same-sex couple headed families accessing the institution of 
marriage at all relates to the willingness or ability of opposite-
sex couples to procreate. 
On the second state interest, that of ensuring that children 
born to opposite-sex couples are reared in the marital context, it 
is clear that the exclusion of same-sex couples in no way is   
related to this goal, and in fact, operates in direct contradiction to 
the goal.  The dissent noted that “denying same-sex couples the 
right to marry also will not encourage couples who have children 
to marry or to stay married for the benefit of their children.”113  
More importantly, it defies logic to conclude that only the     
children of opposite-sex couples are the ones that deserve the 
benefits that marriage provides.  Children are being reared in 
families headed by same-sex couples, and there is no just basis 
upon which to conclude that the nature of their parents’         
relationship, or the circumstances of their birth should rule them 
ineligible for these state benefits. 
The exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage also fails 
to bear a rational relationship to the third purported state interest 
in promoting traditional nuclear families.  The dissent concludes 
that “even if such a goal is valid, which seems unlikely, denying 
same-sex couples the right to marry has no hope of increasing 
such child rearing.”114  Again, excluding families headed by 
same-sex couples from marriage does not seem to provide any 
meaningful incentives for a homosexual person to choose to 
bring a child into an opposite-sex relationship - the incentive 
operates only with respect to heterosexuals who seek to            
reproduce, offering more benefits to them if they choose to 
marry and fewer if they do not.     
In Lewis v. Harris, the New Jersey Supreme Court         
unanimously found the state’s exclusion of same-sex couples 
from the rights and benefits of marriage to violate the New     
Jersey state constitution’s equal protection clause although the 
majority rejected the plaintiffs’ claim that there was a            
fundamental right for same-sex couples to marry under the New 
Jersey constitution’s liberty clause.115 The court’s equal          
protection standard differs in one important respect from New 
York and Washington’s standard — the New Jersey standard     
requires a heightened finding of a “substantial relationship to a 
legitimate governmental purpose.”116  Additionally, the majority 
did not engage with the possibility that procreation and child 
rearing were justifications for the disparate treatment of same 
and opposite-sex couples. The Attorney General intentionally 
disavowed reliance on those arguments, and the State refused to 
advance it.117  The minority opinion addressed the procreation 
and child-rearing argument and noted that its credibility was 
undermined both by the increasing prevalence of same-sex    
couples rearing children and the fact that social science data did 
not support the notion that opposite-sex couples are better at 
rearing children.118  Seemingly, the only argument advanced by 
the State was uniformity with the laws of other states. But the 
court found this to be wholly inadequate in light of the severity 
of the deprivation of the rights involved and in light of the fact 
that same-sex couples were rearing children.119 
In spite of the different standard of constitutional analysis, 
the Lewis court’s approach appropriately recognizes that any 
classification drawn must bear a rational relation to the purported 
state interest. In both Hernandez and Andersen the courts      
misapplied the rational basis standards by focusing on the      
rationality of extending rights to opposite-sex couples  rearing 
children and conflating the appropriateness of  providing rights 
and benefits to such families with the question of whether a    
classification drawn to deny those rights and benefits to same-
sex couples was related to the interest in child welfare. As the 
court noted in Lewis, “children have the same universal needs 
and wants, whether they are raised in a same-sex or opposite-sex 
family, yet under the current system they are treated               
differently.”120  Unfortunately, this is precisely what the courts in 
Hernandez and Andersen found to be rational. 
Even if it were rational to believe that same-sex couples are 
less capable than opposite-sex couples at rearing children, there 
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would still be no rational furtherance of the goal of promoting 
child welfare by excluding families headed by same-sex couples 
from the rights and benefits of marriage, because there always 
will be families headed by same-sex couples.  The exclusion 
would have to find its rationality in the belief that children see 
their welfare enhanced when their same-sex parents do not have 
the rights and benefits of marriage to secure their relationship 
and benefit their family.  Of course, this does nothing to enhance 
the child’s welfare, and accordingly, defies rationality. 
It is not mere under-inclusiveness which makes the          
justifications made by Hernandez and Andersen wrong, it is the 
belief that the denial of rights and benefits to families headed by 
same-sex couples is related, at all, to the goal of promoting child 
welfare.  Same-sex couples have children, rear children, and will 
continue to rear children irrespective of the additional rights and 
benefits the state creates for the couple and the children they 
rear.  With this being the reality of the society we live in, and 
with children bearing no responsibility for the actions or sexual 
orientation of their parents, “there is no rational basis for visiting 




With courts declaring that marriage statutes were enacted to 
benefit children, any meaningful evaluation of the exclusive  
nature of marriage statutes must account for the exclusion of the 
children of same-sex couples from the benefits of marriage.  
Such exclusion directly disadvantages children who are and who 
will continue to be reared by same-sex couples, and it does so 
solely on account of the status of the couples rearing the        
children. Drawing a classification based on the status of the      
couple parenting the child in no way furthers the state interest in 
child welfare, and accordingly, such exclusions cannot withstand 
an intellectually honest rational basis review. 
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